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1 Introduction
The productivity-enhancing effects of specialization have been a classic theme
in economics since at least Adam Smith. While it is a truism that some spe-
cialization enhances productivity, it is also true that most jobs are by defini-
tion somewhat specialized, so the meaningful empirical question is whether
further specialization helps at the margin, that is, whether there are any
unexploited gains from specialization.
A large empirical literature estimates the gains from specialization in pro-
fessions as different as surgeons, school teachers, and clerks. This literature
has had to confront two key identification issues. First, workers are in gen-
eral not randomly exposed to specialization: they choose, or are selected into
their specialty. Second, the measurement of the benefits from specialization
might be biased if unobservable task characteristics influence the type and
extent of specialization of the worker to which the task is assigned. Some
papers in the literature reviewed below address one source of endogeneity,
but no paper that we know of addresses both. In this paper we are able
to address both identification concerns due to the explicitly random process
through which workers (judges, in our case) are assigned tasks.
In our setting, a computer (which, incidentally, takes no account of the
judges’ backlogs) randomly assigns cases to judges. This means that, oc-
casionally, a judge will be assigned a disproportionate number of cases of
a given type – Pension cases, for example. These random occurrences will
periodically result in situations when a judge’s docket is rich with cases of
that same type, which means that a judge is randomly exposed to specializa-
tion. Also, the random assignment of cases ensures that unobservable task
characteristics are assigned orthogonally to the judges’ specialization. We
leverage this uniquely favorable identification scenario to obtain estimates of
the productivity-enhancing effects of specialization.
We estimate whether our workers get any faster and more accurate on
type-A tasks when they are assigned many type-A tasks. A model is required
to go from these estimates to the gains from specialization. The theory sec-
tion presents such a model starting at a general level, and then specializing
to the case where team production is the sum of individual workers’ produc-
tion functions with a convenient parametric functional form. The analysis
yields mathematical conditions on the parameters of these functions such
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that returns from specialization are positive.
We find that judges indeed do get faster (more likely to close a case in
any given hearing) during those times when their docket is rich with cases
of that same type. We also find that, all else equal, having more other case
types actually slows down the judge. As for accuracy, as best we can measure
we find that more-specialized (in the above sense) judges are not differently
accurate, in that we find that their decisions don’t get appealed at a higher
or lower rate.
After a review of the literature in Section 2, we present the theory in
Section 3. Section 4 describes the data and the institutional setting, while
the empirical model is presented in Section 5. Results are discussed in Section
6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is a large literature on labor specialization in many different fields.
Many papers, including KC and Staats (2012) and KC et al. (2013) study
of the impact of volume of surgery and specialization on patient outcomes.
A meta-analysis of this literature (Chowdhury et al., 2007) finds that high-
volume and specialist surgeons have significantly better outcomes (in 74 and
91 percent of the studies, respectively). However, of the 163 studies covered
in this meta-study, none were randomized. Staats and Gino (2012) study
data-entry clerks and find that specialization is beneficial within the course
of a single day, but across days, variety improves productivity. Narayan et al.
(2016) study software engineers and find that experience with a given module
improves productivity. Friebel and Yilmaz (2016) compare the productivity
of call center agents who are “less specialized,” i.e., have a greater number of
certified “skills” and are more experienced, with “more specialized” agents
(fewer skills, shorter tenure). Ost (2104) and Cook and Mansfield (2016)
study teachers rotating across subjects to parse out the relative contribution
of general or subject-specific experience to productivity.
None of the above papers leverages random assignment as a source of
specialization.
We now review the literature on judicial specialization. The judicial pro-
fession is slowly specializing (see Baum 2011). But this trend is controversial
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because specialization is perceived to have pros and cons. Baum (2009, sec.
III) discusses the pros (speed, accuracy, and uniformity) and cons (excessive
assertiveness, insularity, tendency to stereotype, narrow selection into the
judicial profession, vulnerability to capture by specialized interest groups)
of judicial specialization. The analysis in this paper aims to quantify the
first two pros: speed and accuracy. Landes and Posner (2003) argue that
specialized courts might generate new incentives to sue. According to them,
that is what happened in the United States when the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982. In this paper we do not consider
such general equilibrium effects.
A number of empirical analyses exist regarding the effect of specialization
or experience on different measure of judicial productivity (Miller and Curry
2009; Hansford 2011; Kesan and Ball 2011; Sustersic and Zajc 2011). These
papers do not exploit exogenous variation in specialization.
A number of papers study other determinants of judicial productivity
beyond specialization. Djankov et al. (2003) argue that cross-country differ-
ences in the effectiveness of judicial systems depend primarily on the level of
procedural formality of legal systems. Dimitrova-Grajzl et al. (2012) use an
internal instrument to assess how judicial staffing levels impact court pro-
ductivity. Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) study the effects of introducing
incentive pay for judges, and find a complex set of effects on judicial pro-
ductivity. Ash and McLeod (2014, 2016) study how the performance of US
judges depends on their case load, on their tenure, and on their electoral
incentives.
In previous work (Coviello et al. 2014, 2015; Bray et al. 2016) we have
shown that judicial workflow management practices, and in particular mul-
titasking, can have a significant impact on judicial productivity. This line of
work is distinct from the present paper because workflow management refers
to the efficient (or not) scheduling of individual hearings of different cases,
whereas the present paper looks at the probability of closing a case in a given
hearing, that is, conditional on how the workflow has been managed.1
1To see the difference, consider two cases A and B each of which require at most
two hearings to conclude. Cases A and B are adjudicated in their first hearing with
probabilities p1,A, p1,B > 0, else a second hearing is necessary. In previous work (Coviello
et al. 2014, 2015; Bray et al. 2016) we have shown that it is more efficient to wait until case
A is adjudicated before starting on case B. This is workflow management. In the present
paper, we ask whether p1,B gets larger owing to the fact that the judge has accumulated
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Stepping back from judicial productivity as the outcome of interest, a
number of studies have exploited the random assignment of cases to judges
for identification in a variety of economic settings: see e.g. Ashenfelter et al.
(1995), Kling (2006), Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2013). In addition, some
recent papers explore impact of judicial reforms on a variety of economic
outcomes (Lilienfeld-Toal et at. 2012, Ponticelli and Alencar 2016); this
literature is only peripherally related to our work insofar as it demonstrates
the judicial performance impacts economic growth.
3 Theory of labor specialization
This section presents a general theory of team production whose basic insight
is that, with a convex objective function and linear constraints, the optimal
solution will be on a corner of the polyhedron defined by the linear con-
straints. Then, a convenient parametric functional form is proposed for the
individual workers’ production functions, and mathematical conditions are
provided on the parameters of these functions such that aggregate productiv-
ity improves if workers become specialized (either randomly or deliberately)
in tasks of different types.
This setting covers many types of team productions. A classic example
would be Adam Smith’s pin factory, where different workers are each assigned
different tasks. In this case performance will be measured by how quickly and
accurately each task is accomplished. For a judge, a task might be a trial.
If there are type-A and type-B trials, and if judge 1 has more experience
in type-A trials than judge 2, is judge 1 more likely to adjudicate a type-A
trials in any given hearing, and is her decision less likely to be appealed?
Within our empirical context the theory is used to investigate whether
random specialization will likely improve productivity. Although complete
specialization is not a feasible assignment, the extent of specialization that
comes from random specialization appears to lead to greater efficiency. We
acknowledge that fully-specialized courts may themselves have problems that
we do not investigate. Hence, we are not making a policy recommendation
about complete specialization.
There are J workers indexed by j. There are K task types indexed by k.
experience by working on case A.
5
Task type k has numerosity Nk. The total number of tasks is N. A worker j’s
total workload is fixed at Nj with the stipulation that
∑
j Nj = N =
∑
kNk.
Let nj,k denote the number of type-k tasks allocated to worker j.We wish
to allocate tasks to workers so as to maximize some objective function, for
example, number of tasks accomplished in a certain time interval, or number
of non-mishandled tasks (if performance quality is an issue). We denote the
objective function by f (n) , where n is the vector with generic element nj,k.
Our problem is:
max
n
f (n) subject to: (1)∑
k
nj,k = Nj for all j (a judge’s workload is fixed at Nj) (2)
∑
j
nj,k = Nk for all k (exactly Nk cases are allocated) (3)
nj,k ≥ 0 for all j, k (4)
There is a natural sense in which the convexity of f captures the returns
to specialization. If a strictly convex f is being maximized over some convex
set X, then the maximizer(s) must be extremal, that is, they must lie at the
boundaries of the set X. Extremal allocations captures “division of labor,”
in a sense made precise in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (If f is quasi-convex it is optimal to specialize) Sup-
pose the objective function f is strictly convex. Then in the solution to prob-
lem (1) there cannot be two workers who are assigned positive amounts of the
same two task types.
In spirit, this proposition says that if f is convex then it is optimal for
each worker to be fully specialized in a single case type. But this statement
can’t literally hold for all workers due to integer problems. So, the more
nuanced statement contained in the proposition is this: if two workers are
assigned a positive amount of a given (same) task type, then there can be no
other task type that these two workers have in common.
Next we provide a specific (and strictly convex, depending on parame-
ters) functional form for the function f (n) . We want this functional form
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to be parsimonious, and yet to allow for learning-by-doing effects. Our basic
building block is a type-specific productivity factor P k.When this framework
is applied to judges, P k will stand for the probability with which judge j re-
solves a case of type k in a given hearing or, alternatively, for the probability
that a case k is not appealed conditional on it being resolved. We posit that
P k depends on how many other type-k and non-type-k tasks the worker is
assigned, through the following linear model:
P j,k (nj,k, nj,−k) = Ck + γj + nj,kβsame + nj,−kβother, (5)
where nj,−k denotes the number of non-type-k tasks assigned to the worker:
nj,−k
def
=
∑
κ 6=k
nj,κ .
The right-hand side of equation (5) can also be interpreted as the first-
order Taylor approximation of a nonlinear function. For example, suppose
the dependent variable (case resolved or not) is generated by a probit model:
Φ (βk + βj + β1nj,k + β2nj,−k) .
Then the first-order approximation is:
Φ0 + Φ
′ · (βk + βj + β1nj,k + β2nj,−k)
where Φ0 and Φ
′ are evaluated at the mean of the variables. Thus using
probit to estimate the marginal effect of the variables of interest yields effects
that are related to the linear model (5) as follows: Φ′ · β1 = βsame and
Φ′ · β2 = βother.
If βsame > 0 then workers become more productive on type-k tasks by
being assigned more tasks of that same type; we expect βsame’s estimates
to be nonnegative. If βother > 0 then workers get better at type-k tasks by
being assigned more non-k tasks; so there is some transferability in experience
across task types. If βother < 0 then being assigned more non-A tasks for
given amount of A tasks hurts a worker’s productivity on type-A tasks. This
might happen if the worker’s memory is a finite repository that can only hold
so much knowledge, and that memory is used in proportion to the type of
tasks that she is assigned. We assume Ck + γj > 0 to ensure that even an
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inexperienced worker (one for whom nj,k and nj,−k equal zero) has a positive
productivity.
We assume that our objective function has the following functional form:
f (n) = A
∑
j
∑
k
nj,kP
j,k (nj,k, nj,−k) , (6)
where A is a positive constant. f (n) represents the total production achieved
by the entire pool of workers. Note that this function has curvature in nj,k
even though P j,k(·) is a linear function.
Later in the paper we will use the function f (n) to measure two different
dimensions of judicial productivity: how many cases all judges close in a
given number of hearings, and separately, how many judicial decisions are
appealed. The objective function f (n) is sufficiently flexible to capture both
dimensions of productivity. If we let P j,k represent the “probability that
a decisions is not appealed,” then f (n) represents the total number of non-
appealed decisions (which it is socially desirable to maximize). Alternatively,
P j,k may represent the “probability of closing a case in a given hearing,” in
which case we would like the functional form to represent the total number
of decisions achieved by all judges; however, in order for this interpretation
to be valid there is a gap that needs to be bridged. The gap is that our
empirical counterpart for (nj,k, nj,−k) will be number of cases, but P
j,k will
be estimated as the probability of concluding a case within a given hearing.
Therefore, the term nj,k that multiplies P
j,k in (6) should be measured in
hearings, not cases. As there are roughly 3 hearings to each case, setting
A = 3 allows us to interpret (6) as the total amount of decisions produced
by all judges within a certain number of hearings.
When objective function (6) is convex, its maximizers are extremal per
Proposition 1. The next proposition spells out sufficient conditions for con-
vexity.
Proposition 2 (Sufficient conditions for specialization to be opti-
mal) Suppose P j,k is given by (5). The objective function f defined in (6)
is strictly convex if any of the following conditions hold:
1. βsame > 0 and βsame ≥ (K − 1) · βother
8
2. βother ≥ 0 and βsame > βother
3. the matrix


βsame βother βother
βother
. . . βother
βother βother βsame

 is positive definite.
Intuitively, this result indicates that the objective function (6) is convex if
the benefits of specific learning-by-doing (measured by the coefficient βsame)
exceed the benefits of generic learning-by-doing (measured by the coefficient
βother). When this is the case, it is optimal to specialize the allocation of
labor. When the estimates for βsame and βother are obtained from a nonlinear
model for P j,k, the conditions in Proposition 2 deliver local convexity for
f (n).
We now present a numerical simulation which illustrates that judges are
more efficient when they specialize.
Example 1 Set Ck = 0.3, γj = 0 in expression (6). Then a judge j who is
assigned a case mix (nj,A, nj,B) has a probability P
j,A(nj,A, nj,−A) = (0.3 +
nj,A · βsame + nj,B · βother) of resolving a type-A case, and a probability
P j,B(nj,A, nj,−A) = (0.3 + nj,B · βsame + nj,A · βother) of resolving a type-B
case. We set nj,B = 100 − nj,A , meaning that the judge’s docket is exactly
100 cases, and βsame = 0.00208, βother = −0.0006, which are rescaled point
estimates from Table 3 (these estimates are discussed in Sections 5 and 6).
For every value nj,A = 0, 1, ..., 100 we simulate a total of 100 random draws
from the two binomial distributions, and count how many A and B cases
were resolved by the judge. Figure 1 plots the total number of resolved cases
(A and B) against nj,A.
2 The graph tends to be higher at the extremes of the
interval, which demonstrates that the judge resolves more total cases when
her docket is specialized.
We use our theory to compute the effect on the amount of cases closed
f (n) of a marginal increase in specialization, namely: having judge j swap-
ping a single case with judge j′. The switch does not affect the allocation
of any judges other than j and j′, hence the effect on productivity will be
limited to judges j and j′. The aggregate effect of the swap on both judges’
productivity is as follows.
2In Figure 1 the (black) line is a quadratic approximation of the simulated data.
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Figure 1: Numerical example: Judges are more efficient when they specialize
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Proposition 3 (productivity gains from specialization) Consider two
judges j, j′ who are allocated nj,κ, nj′,κ type-κ and nj,κ′ , nj′,κ′ type-κ
′ cases.
Suppose judge j swaps a case with judge j′ so that judge j is assigned one
more hearing of type κ and one fewer hearing of type κ′, and vice versa for
judge j′. The resulting change in the total production f (n) is:
2A [(nj,κ − nj′,κ) (βsame − βother) + (nj′,κ′ − nj,κ′) (βsame − βother)] .
The returns to specialization are increasing in the level of specialization.
The latter is represented by the term (nj,κ − nj′,κ) which is positive if judge
j is more specialized in cases of type κ than judge j′, and by the term
(nj′,κ′ − nj,κ′) which is positive if judge j
′ is more specialized in cases of
type κ′ than judge j. Assuming that Proposition 1’s sufficient conditions for
convexity are met, the above expression is larger and hence total productivity
is more likely to be improved by the switch, when: judge j already handles
more κ-hearings than judge j′, and judge j′ already handles more κ′-hearings
than judge j (that is, there are increasing returns from specialization); and
when specific experience matters more (βsame−βother is larger). Notably, the
productivity gains do not depend on the judges’ ability γj, on the difficulty
of the case types Ck, or on the judge’s docket of “other” cases nj,−k.
4 Data and institutional setting
4.1 The data
Our dataset contains all the 234,050 cases filed between January 1, 2001
and December 31, 2010 in the labor court in Rome, Italy. This is the labor
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court of first instance in Europe’s largest tribunal for number of cases.3 The
disputes occur between the firm and one or more of its workers. The nature
of the dispute is coded in court filings according to the following typology:
allowances, damages, other type of controversies (Type I, classified by the
curt), disability, pension, temporary contracts, firing, qualification, other
type of controversies (Type II, residual group).
We observe the entire history of each case from filing to disposition. Most
dispositions take the form of a ruling (69.5%) or of a settlement between the
parties (12%). The rest of the dispositions represent cases where a party
withdraws its claim, or where the suit cannot be adjudicated owing to factual
or procedural reasons that become known after filing, or because exceptional
circumstances arise. We code all dispositions, without regard to their form,
as taking effect on the date of the case’s last hearing.
Cases on average last about one year, are completed in three hearings and
are appealed 10% of the times. To avoid right censoring of the data, we only
keep cases filed between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2010. Allowances
(22%), damages (24%), and other hypotheses (11%) represent the majority
of the cases filed to this court (see Table 1 for details).
Our model is based on the idea that a judge’s productivity in a given
hearing is a function of her experience up to that hearing. Our main proxy
for experience in a given hearing will be n, the number of cases assigned to
the judge within the recent past. We presume that recent experience might
be more relevant, but we don’t want to take a stand on exactly what counts
as “recent:” thus in the empirical analysis we will run three different models
based on the length of the experience window: 1 year back from current
hearing, 2 years back from current hearing, ever within our sample. Note
that these variables are computed individually for every hearing of every
case. So, for example, for a Pension-case hearing held on May 2, 2005, the
variables nsame (nother) for that hearing records how many Pension (non-
Pension) cases have been assigned to the judge within 1 year, 2 years, or
ever, up to May 2, 2005. Table 2 indicates that, for the average hearing,
the mean number of cases of the same type assigned to the judge equals 98
in the previous year; 710 are instead the assigned cases of a different type.
Similarly for other intervals.
3See http://www.repubblica.it/2007/01/sezioni/cronaca/bolzoni-tribunale/bolzoni-
tribunale/bolzoni-tribunale.html
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the cases
mean sd p50 n
Duration of trials 413 300 349 234050
Prob. Appeal .095 .29 0 234050
N. hearings 3.5 2.1 3 234050
N. parties involved 2.8 3.6 2 234050
Type of Cases
Allowances .22 .42 0 234050
Damages .24 .43 0 234050
Other type I .11 .31 0 234050
Disability .038 .19 0 234050
Pension .058 .23 0 234050
Temp. Contracts .046 .21 0 234050
Firing .089 .28 0 234050
Qualification .023 .15 0 234050
Other type II .17 .38 0 234050
Note: Statistics for all the cases filed to the Labor Court of Rome between
January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2010.
Table 2 also reports the summary statistics on the variable h which rep-
resents the number of hearings that the judge holds (in the same intervals of
1 year before the current hearing, 2 years before, or ever within our sample.)
Note that while our focus is on the outcome of cases filed in the 2001-2010
period, we compute n and h using all the data till December 31, 2014.
Finally, Table 2 indicates that the (unconditional) probability that a case
is closed in a given hearing is approximately 30% while Figure 2 indicates
that 75% of the cases are closed within four hearings.4
The cases are handled by a total, over our entire time period, of 85 full-
time labor judges. We know the age and gender of these judges.
4Figure 2 plots the cumulative distributions of the probability of closing a case condi-
tional on survival up to that hearing (Kaplan-Meier failure function).
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Table 2: Experience correlates, by hearing of each case
mean sd p50 n
Prob. of closing the case .29 .45 0 808583
Cases assigned (in 1,000)
nsame−type, w/in 1yr .098 .066 .097 808583
nother−type, w/in 1yr .71 .22 .69 808583
nsame−type, w/in 2yrs .19 .11 .19 808583
nother−type, w/in 2yrs 1.3 .34 1.4 808583
nsame−type, ever .51 .37 .42 808583
nother−type, ever 3.6 1.9 3.4 808583
Hearings held (in 1,000)
hsame−type, w/in 1yr .36 .23 .32 808583
hother−type, w/in 1yr 2 .71 1.9 808583
hsame−type, w/in 2yrs .65 .42 .59 808583
hother−type, w/in 2yrs 3.7 1.5 3.7 808583
hsame−type, ever 1.6 1.3 1.2 808583
hother−type, ever 9.3 6.1 8.6 808583
Note: nsame−type, w/in 1yr (2 yrs) [ever] is the number of cases assigned of the same
type of every case, in every hearing in the previous year (two years) [ever]. hother−type,
w/in 1yr (2 yrs) [ever] is the number of cases assigned of different type, in every hearing
in the previous year (two years) [ever]. hsame−type, w/in 1yr (2 yrs) [ever] is the number
of hearings held of the same type of every case, in every hearing in the previous year
(two years) [ever]. hother−type, w/in 1yr (2 yrs) [ever] is the number of hearings held of
different type, in every hearing in the previous year (two years) [ever]. n(h)same−type,
and n(h)other−type in 1,000 cases.
Figure 2: Fraction of cases closed within a certain number of hearings
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4.2 Institutional setting, including procedure for ran-
dom allocation
All Italian judges hold a law degree and are selected through a public ex-
amination covering all subjects and procedural rules in law. They are paid
a fixed wage that increases with seniority but is largely independent of per-
formance. Performance matters, in addition to seniority, if and when judges
request to be transferred across courts and functions.
In our court each judge is solely responsible for adjudicating the cases
assigned to him or her. No jury or other judges are involved. Judges are not
allowed to render themselves unavailable for assignments, unless they are sick
for long periods (more than one week). In a few rare cases some judges show
prolonged periods of inactivity (many months). Because their experience is
atypical, we elect to drop them from our sample.
Random assignment among the “relevant” judges is required by law (Art.
25 of the Italian Constitution). The goal of this law is to ensure the absence of
any relationship between the identity of judges and the characteristics of the
cases assigned to them, including the identity of lawyers and the complexity
of cases. In our court, random assignment is implemented by a computer
that is managed by a court clerk who, in turn, is supervised by an assigned
judge.5
5 Empirical models
Our goal is to estimate the parameters βsame and βother in the probability
function (5) by exploiting random streaks of same-type cases which create
mini-specialization events.
When the outcome is the probability of closing the case in a given hearing,
the corresponding empirical model is:
Ii,u = α+βsamenj,k,t+βothernj,−k,t+βnpnpi+γj+δu+Ck+ηt+µa+ ǫi,u. (7)
where Ii,u is a dummy taking value one if case i is closed in its u-th hearing;
j is the identifier of the judge to whom case i is assigned; k is case i’s type;
5 In Appendix OA we report detailed statistical evidence supporting random assign-
ment.
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t is the calendar date in which the u-th hearing of case i is held. nj,k,t is
the number of k-type cases assigned to judge j in the 365 (730, ever) days
prior to the date of the u-th hearing, and nj,−k,t is the number of non-k-type
cases assigned to judge j in the 365 (730, ever) days prior to the date t, both
measured as fractions of 1,000 cases. npi is the number of parties involved in
the trial; γj are the judge fixed effects; δu are the u-th hearing fixed effects
(first, second, third ...). Ck are the nine case-type fixed effects; ηt are fixed
effects for the week in which the u-th hearing is held. Finally the model also
includes fixed effects µa for the week of assignment of each case.
It should be noted that an observation is a hearing of a case. Therefore,
strictly speaking, equation (7) is not correctly notated. In our database an
observation is uniquely identified by the case id and the hearing counter (i, u)
alone, and the indices j, k, and t in equation (7) should in fact be correctly
notated as j (i) , k (i) , t (i, u) . But the correct notation is more cumbersome
and, perhaps, less transparent, so we opted for the simpler notation in equa-
tion (7).
Random assignment of cases across judges guarantees that they can-
not select endogenously the number of cases of each type assigned to them
(which would create a problem if their selection reflected unobservables such
as knowledge about a certain type of case, etc.). Random assignment also
addresses also another concern: type-k cases might be more likely to be liti-
gated during those times in which type-k jurisprudence is less settled, making
type-k cases of this vintage simultaneously more numerous and more diffi-
cult to adjudicate. If this were the case then we would incorrectly attribute
to specialization an effect that is in fact related to unobserved variation in
the difficulty of cases. For these and similar reasons, we include the week
of assignment fixed effects, µa so that the variation that identifies the β
coefficients originates from random assignment.
We cluster standard errors at the judge and hearing week level. A possi-
ble concern with this two-way clustering strategy is that autocorrelation in
backlogs might mechanically induce correlation across hearing dates, which
would not be captured by the two-way clustering. Following a more con-
servative approach, in the online Appendix OB we report estimates of the
standard errors clustered at the judge level.
When the outcome is the probability of appeal the empirical model cor-
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responding to (5) is:
Appeali = α + βsamenj,k,a + βothernj,−k,a + βnpnpi + γj + Ck + µa + ǫi. (8)
where Appeali is a dummy taking value 1 if case i is appealed and the other
variables are defined as descried above. In this equation there is one obser-
vation per case, which is dated at the week of assignment a.
6 Effect of specialization on productivity
Table 3 reports the estimated effects of experience on the probability of clos-
ing a case. The estimates indicate that, in all three specifications of the
experience window, the estimated coefficient βsame is positive and greater
than βother. Furthermore, the difference between the two coefficients is sta-
tistically significant as indicated by the p-values.6 Therefore, by Proposition
2 the objective function is convex and so it is optimal for judges to special-
ize. Interestingly, the coefficients βother are negative suggesting, according to
the interpretation in Section 3, that judges get worse at type-k cases when
they are assigned more non-k cases; apparently, there is no transferability in
experience across case types.
Figure 3 plots the distribution of the judge fixed effects estimates from
the same regression of Table 3. This figure shows that there is significant
heterogeneity between judges in the probability of closing a case conditional
on specialization and on holding any given hearing (and controlling for a large
set of case- and time- fixed effects). The figure also displays the outcome of
a joint test for the statistical significance of the judges fixed effects (see the
p-value of the F-test that all γj = 0 in Figure 3).
In Table 4 we compute the effects of specialization on the probability of
closing a case of a given type. We compute the probabilities of closing a
case for a highly specialized judge (one who is at the 75th percentile of the
specialization distribution of nsame) and for a less specialized one (resp., 25
th
percentile of nsame), keeping all other case types at their mean. The former
judge is more than twice as likely as the latter to close a case (for example
6The statistical significance of these results is unchanged if we compute standard errors
clustered at the judge level, see Table OB.1.
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Figure 3: Probability of closing a case conditional on having held a hearing
0
2
4
6
8
Ju
dg
es
 (%
)
−.6 −.4 −.2 0 .2 .4
Judge Fixed Effects (γj)
F test that all γj =0 (p−value): 0.001
in a two-year window, 13.45% vs. 5.38%). The table reports the estimates
for the three time windows used in our main estimates.
The theoretical analysis in Section 3 can be applied to the probability of
appeal, with the proviso that specialization should be considered beneficial if
appeals are reduced, which means that the function f must now be concave,
or equivalently, −f must be convex.
Condition 1 in Proposition 2, when applied to −f , says that specialization
is beneficial in reducing appeals if βsame < 0 and βsame − βother < 0. Table
5 hints at a possible beneficial effect of specialization on the probability of
appeal, in that the estimates for βsame − βother are always negative, and sta-
tistically significant in column 2 only. We note, however, that the estimated
coefficients do not decrease as clearly with the estimation window, compared
with the coefficients in Table 3. Thus, we interpret the estimates as merely
suggestive that specialization may have a beneficial effect in terms of appeal
reductions.7
As discussed in Section 3, assuming that the dependent variable (case
resolved or not) is generated by a probit model should produce comparable
estimates of the effects of specialization (see Section 15.8.2 in Wooldrige,
2010). In Table B.1 (even columns) we report the estimates obtained from a
probit model with judge random effects, which are allowed to be correlated
with the main parameter of interest βsame. As predicted by the theory these
estimates are comparable in magnitude and statistical significance to our
7The same specification, one in which the observations are cases, not hearings, can be
used to predict the number of hearings that were necessary to close a case. If specialization
is found to decrease the number of hearings that were necessary to close a case, then
specialization is beneficial. The estimates from this specification are reported in Table
OB.2 in the online appendix, and confirm the beneficial effect of specialization.
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Table 3: Effect of specialization on the probability of closing a case
Dep. Var. Prob.Close Prob.Close Prob.Close
Method OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
nsame−type, w/in 1yr 0.208***
(0.037)
nother−type, w/in 1yr -0.060***
(0.012)
nsame−type, w/in 2yrs 0.156***
(0.024)
nother−type, w/in 2yrs -0.046***
(0.008)
nsame−type, ever 0.049***
(0.016)
nother−type, ever -0.019
(0.013)
Test for βsame 6= βother: .268 .202 .068
p-value .001 .001 .001
Judge FE Yes Yes Yes
Week of hearing FE Yes Yes Yes
Type of case FE Yes Yes Yes
Hearing number FE Yes Yes Yes
Week of assignment FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of judges 85 85 85
Number of cases 234,050 234,050 234,050
Observations 808,583 808,583 808,583
Note: An observation is a hearing of a case. The dependent variable
is a dummy for the closure of a case in a given hearing. For each case,
nsame−type, w/in 1yr (w/in 2yrs; ever) is the (per 1000) number of
cases of the same type assigned to the judge before the hearing within
1year (within 2years; ever). Similarly for nother−type. All regressions
control for the number of parties involved in the trial. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the judge and week of the hearing level
(two-way clustering). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
baseline estimates. Table B.2 reports similar estimates for the probability of
appeal, which are compatible with the prediction of our theory.8
8Probit estimates are obtained in a more parsimonious model than the one discussed
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Table 4: Effects of specialization on the probability of closing a case for
different levels of judicial specialization
Specialization (percentiles) Low: 25th High: 75th Diff.
(1) (2) (3)
w/in 1 year 3.59 9.32 5.74
w/in 2 years 5.38 13.45 8.07
ever 3.79 12.59 8.79
Note: Columns 1 and 2 report 100·βsame ·n
q
same divided by the
average probability of closing a case. The βsame’s come from
Table 3 for different time windows, and nqsame represents the
q-th quartile in the distribution of nsame. Column 1 reports
the effects at the 25th percentile of nsame, and Column 2 at its
75th percentile. The 25th percentile of nsame, w/in 1yr (w/in
2yrs; ever) (per 1000) are .05,.10, and .22; while the 75th
percentiles are .13 .25 .73, respectively. Column 3 reports the
difference between the first two columns and is interpreted as
the % change in the probability of closing a case that a judge
can achieve by specializing in a given type of cases, keeping
all other case types at their mean.
Overall our estimates support the notion that specialization increases the
probability of closing cases and does not reduce the quality of decisions.
7 Conclusions
The literature that estimates the gains from labor specialization has had
to confront two key identification issues. First, workers are in general not
randomly exposed to specialization; second, the measurement of the benefits
from specialization might be biased if tasks are not randomly assigned to
workers. In this paper we were able to address both identification concerns
due to the explicitly random process through which our workers are assigned
tasks. We have leveraged this uniquely favorable identification scenario to
in Equation 7, because including all the controls that are used in the linear probability
model interferes with the convergence of the maximum likelihood algorithm. Also, the
likelihood function does not accommodate two-way cluster standard errors. For compara-
bility across models, the odd columns of Tables B.1 and Table B.2 also report the estimates
from the linear probability model in this more parsimonious specification. The effects are
comparable.
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Table 5: Effect of specialization on the probability of appeal
Dep. Var Prob.Appeal Prob.Appeal Prob.Appeal
Method OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
nsame−type, w/in 1yr -0.0419
(0.032)
nother−type, w/in 1yr 0.0172
(0.012)
nsame−type, w/in 2yrs -0.0483*
(0.024)
nother−type, w/in 2yrs 0.0105
(0.007)
nsame−type, ever -0.0059
(0.007)
nother−type, ever -0.0027
(0.004)
Test for βsame 6= βother: -0.059 -0.059 -0.003
p-value 0.145 0.041 0.632
Judge FE Yes Yes Yes
Type of case FE Yes Yes Yes
Week of assignment FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of judges 85 85 85
Observations 234,050 234,050 234,050
Note: An observation is a case. The dependent variable is a dummy for the
event that the case is appealed. For each case, nsame−type, w/in 1yr (w/in
2yrs; ever) is the (per 1000) number of cases of the same type assigned to
the judge before the hearing within 1 year (within 2 years; ever). Similarly
for nother−type. All regressions control for the number of parties involved
in the trial. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the judge and
week of assignment level (two-way clustering). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
obtain estimates of the productivity-enhancing effects of specialization.
The estimates suggest that if judges were more specialized they would
be considerably faster, i.e., more likely to close a case in any given hearing
of it; quality, as measured by probability of appeal, would not be negatively
affected. These results indicate large and unexploited gains from specializa-
tion for this particular group of workers, a finding that may be interpreted
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as a “free lunch,” and thus regarded skeptically by some readers. However,
when viewed from an organizational economics perspective, the judiciary is
an unusual workplace: as an organization it is not exposed to competition;
and its employees (judges) are, by design, insulated from authority and from
monetary incentives in most work-related actions. Given high autonomy and
soft incentives, it is not too surprising that large productivity gains remain
unexploited.
Our analysis has policy relevance because judicial productivity matters
a great deal for economic growth and development,9 and also because the
process of specialization which is taking place in the judicial profession is alive
with controversy. A number of caveats must therefore be raised regarding
the policy implications of this work. First, this paper is certainly not the
last word; its findings need to be replicated across different courts, ideally
with controlled field trials. Second, as well as benefits, judicial specialization
may entail the drawbacks listed in Section 2: our estimates can hopefully
provide quantitative estimates for the benefits, thus giving a sense of the
magnitude of one side of the cost-benefit equation. Third, labor specialization
requires scale, and accordingly, judicial specialization requires courts with
many judges. Judicial systems that have many small courts will require
mergers in order to reach the requisite scale. These mergers may be politically
difficult.
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Appendices
A Theory
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let’s consider the feasible set X in our problem. It is the sub-
space {nj,k} ⊂ R
J×K such that (2 - 4) are satisfied. Clearly, this feasible
set is convex. If our objective function is convex, then the solutions must
be extremal. What are the properties of extremal solutions? Consider an
allocation x = {nj,k} where two judges j and j
′ are assigned:
0 < nj,k
0 < nj,k′
0 < nj′,k
0 < nj′,k′
for some k, k′. Construct the following allocations:
Allocation y. y is equal to x in every entry except for: yj,k = nj,k +
ε; yj,k′ = nj,k′ − ε; yj′,k = nj,k − ε; yj′,k′ = nj′,k′ + ε
Allocation z. z is equal to x in every entry except for: zj,k = nj,k −
ε; zj,k′ = nj,k′ + ε; zj′,k = nj,k + ε; zj′,k′ = nj′,k′ − ε
Allocation y transfers a few type-k′ cases from judge j to judge j′; and
balances by transfering the same number of type-k cases from judge j′ to
judge j. Allocation z shifts cases in the opposite direction. These allocations
are constructed so that
x =
1
2
y +
1
2
z.
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Furthermore, allocations y and z are feasible because they satisfy (2 - 4):∑
k
yj,k =
∑
k
nj,k + ε− ε = Nj for all j
∑
j
yj,k =
∑
j
nj,k + ε− ε = Nk for all k
yj,k ≥ 0 for all j, k provided ε is sufficiently small
The same holds for allocation z.
Thus we have constructed two feasible allocations y, z such that x =
αy + (1− α) z for some α ∈ (0, 1). It follows that f (x) < max [f (y) , f (z)]
for every strictly quasi-convex function f. Therefore allocation x could not
be a maximizer for any strictly quasi-convex function. Thus we have shown
that in the optimal allocation there cannot be two judges who are assigned
a positive amount of the same two types of cases.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We state and prove a somewhat more general version of Proposition 2. The
added generality is that we allow the coefficient βsame to now be specific to
each case type, and we denote each coefficient by βk. In addition, we denote
βother by the shorter β−. Thus, the function H
k now reads:
P k (nj,k, nj,−k) = Ck + γj + nj,kβk + nj,−kβ−, (9)
The case dealt with in the main body of the paper is the special case
where β1 = ... = βK = βsame.
Lemma 1 (Convexity requires specific learning-by-doing dominates
generic learning-by-doing) Suppose Hk is given by (9). Then objective
function (6) is strictly convex if any of the following conditions hold:
1. βk > 0 and βk ≥ (K − 1) · β− for all k
2. β− ≥ 0 and βk > β− for all k
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3. the matrix


β1 β− β−
β−
. . . β−
β− β− βK

 is positive definite.
Proof. The objective function can be written as:∑
j
∑
k
nj,kH
j,k (nj,k, nj,−k)
=
∑
j
∑
k
nj,k (Ck + γj + nj,kβk + nj,−kβ−)
=
∑
j
∑
k
nj,k (Ck + γj + nj,−kβ−) + n
2
j,kβk
Using the identity nj,−k =
∑
κ 6=k nj,k, the Jacobian reads:
J =


judge 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Ck + γ1 + n1,−kβ−) + 2n1,kβk +
∑
κ 6=k
n1,κβ−


k=1...K
...
judge J︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Ck + γJ + nJ,−kβ−) + 2nJ,kβk +
∑
κ 6=k
nJ,κβ−


k=1...K


=

 judge 1︷ ︸︸ ︷[
Ck + γ1 + 2n1,−kβ− + 2n1,kβk
]
k=1...K
...
judge J︷ ︸︸ ︷[
Ck + γJ + 2nJ,−kβ− + 2nJ,kβk
]
k=1...K


The Hessian reads:
H =


A1 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 AJ


where each submatrix
Aj = 2 ·


β1 β− β−
β−
. . . β−
β− β− βK


If each block Aj is positive semidefinite, then H is also positive semidef-
inite (see http://math.stackexchange.com/questions/1715144/showing-that-
a-partitioned-matrix-is-positive-definite ).
A symmetric diagonally dominant real matrix with nonnegative diagonal
entries is positive semidefinite. So Aj is positive definite if βk > 0 for all k
and it is diagonally dominant, that is, if βk ≥ (K − 1) · β− .
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Alternatively, note that
1
2
Aj =


β1 − β− 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 βK − β−

+


β− β− β−
β−
. . . β−
β− β− β−

 ,
so
1
2
vTAjv = v
T


β1 − β− 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 βK − β−

v + β−vT


1 1 1
1
. . . 1
1 1 1

v
= vT


β1 − β− 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 βK − β−

v + β−∑
j
vj
∑
i
vi
= vT


β1 − β− 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 βK − β−

v + β−
(∑
i
vi
)2
.
If β− > 0 the second term is positive and a sufficient condition for positive
definiteness is that the first term is positive, that is, that the matrix:

β1 − β− 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 βK − β−


be positive definite.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The notation in this section follows that of Section A.2
Proof. Recall that:
f (n) = A
∑
j
∑
k
nj,kP
j,k (nj,k, nj,−k)
= A
∑
j
∑
k
nj,k [Ck + γj + nj,kβk + nj,−kβ−] ,
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In the algebra that follows we set the factor A to 1 for notational simplicity.
We will remember to add it at the end.
The effect on productivity f (n) of having judge j swapping a hearing
with judge j′ so that judge j is assigned one more hearing of type κ and one
fewer hearing of type κ′, and vice versa for judge j′, is limited to judges j and
j′. Let’s first focus on the effect on judge j alone. The effect of an increase
in nj,κ is: [
∂f (n)
∂nj,κ
]
+
[
∂f (n)
∂nj,−κ
∂nj,−κ
∂nj,κ
]
[Cκ + γj + 2nj,κβκ + nj,−κβ−]−
[∑
k 6=κ
nj,kβ−
]
.
The effect of a decrease in nj,κ′ is:
− [Cκ′ + γj + 2nj,κ′βκ′ + nj,−κ′β−] +
[∑
k 6=κ′
nj,kβ−
]
.
Adding the two effects together yields:
[Cκ − Cκ′ + 2 (nj,κβκ − nj,κ′βκ′) + (nj,−κ − nj,−κ′) β−]− [(nj,κ′ − nj,κ) β−]
= Cκ − Cκ′ + 2 (nj,κβκ − nj,κ′βκ′) + 2 (nj,−κ − nj,−κ′) β− .
The switch leaves unchanged the total number of cases Nj assigned to judge
j, so substituting from the identity nj,−k = Nj − nj,k, the expression reads:
Cκ − Cκ′ + 2 (nj,κβκ − nj,κ′βκ′) + 2 (nj,κ′ − nj,κ) β−
= Cκ − Cκ′ + 2nj,κ (βκ − β−)− 2nj,κ′ (βκ′ − β−) . (10)
The expression shows that judge j’s productivity is more likely to increase due
to the switch if, relative to type-κ′ hearings, type-κ hearings are more likely
to close (Cκ > Cκ′) , and generate more specific learning-by-doing (βκ > βκ′);
and, assuming that Lemma 1’s sufficient conditions for convexity are met, if
judge j has relatively more type-κ hearings than type-κ′ hearings (nj,κ > nj,κ′).
The corresponding expression to (10) for judge j′ who, recall, swaps one
less κ-hearing for one more κ′ hearing, is:
Cκ′ − Cκ + 2nj′,κ′ (βκ′ − β−)− 2nj′,κ (βκ − β−) . (11)
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Adding (10) and (11) yields the total effect of the swap on both judges’
productivity. It is:
2nj,κ (βκ − β−)− 2nj,κ′ (βκ′ − β−) + 2nj′,κ′ (βκ′ − β−)− 2nj′,κ (βκ − β−) .
Now collect terms and reintroduce A back in to get:
2A [(nj,κ − nj′,κ) (βκ − β−) + (nj′,κ′ − nj,κ′) (βκ′ − β−)] . (12)
B Additional tables
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Table B.1: Robustness: Effect of specialization on the probability of closing a case
Dep. Var. Prob.Close Prob.Close Prob.Close Prob.Close Prob.Close Prob.Close
Model LPM Probit LPM Probit LPM Probit
Method OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
nsame−type, w/in 1yr 0.209*** 0.203***
(0.012) (0.013)
nother−type, w/in 1yr -0.053*** -0.055***
(0.003) (0.003)
nsame−type, w/in 2yrs 0.161*** 0.166***
(0.008) (0.009)
nother−type, w/in 2yrs -0.043*** -0.045***
(0.002) (0.002)
nsame−type, ever 0.043*** 0.053***
(0.004) (0.005)
nother−type, ever -0.025*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.002)
Judge Effect FE RE FE RE FE RE
Week+Year of hearing FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of case FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hearing number FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week+Year of assignment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of judges 85 85 85 85 85 85
Number of cases 234,050 234,050 234,050 234,050 234,050 234,050
Observations 808,583 808,583 808,583 808,583 808,583 808,583
Note: An observation is a hearing of a case. The dependent variable is a dummy for the closure of a case in a given
hearing. For each case, nsame−type, w/in 1yr (w/in 2yrs; ever) is the (per 1000) number of cases of the same type
assigned to the judge before the hearing within 1year (within 2years; ever). Similarly for nother−type. Odd (even)
columns estimate Linear probability (Probit) Models with Judges fixed (random) effects. Even columns report
average partial effects (at the means of the variables) obtained estimating probit random effect models that allow
the random effects to be correlated with nsame−type, w/in 1yr (w/in 2yrs; ever), see Section 15.8.2 in Wooldrige
(2010). All regressions control for the number of parties involved in the trial. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.2: Robustness: Effect of specialization on the probability of appeal
Dep. Var Prob.Appeal Prob.Appeal Prob.Appeal Prob.Appeal Prob.Appeal Prob.Appeal
Model LPM Probit LPM Probit LPM Probit
Method OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
nsame−type, w/in 1yr -0.0491*** -0.0100
(0.0130) (0.0140)
nother−type, w/in 1yr 0.0154*** 0.0053
(0.0040) (0.0033)
nsame−type, w/in 2yrs -0.0512*** -0.0067
(0.0090) (0.0097)
nother−type, w/in 2yrs 0.0112*** 0.0060***
(0.0020) (0.0021)
nsame−type, ever -0.0029 -0.0302***
(0.0040) (0.0054)
nother−type, ever 0.0014 0.0070***
(0.0020) (0.0020)
Judge Effect FE RE FE RE FE RE
Type of case FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week+Year of assignment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of judges 85 85 85 85 85 85
Observations 234,050 234,050 234,050 234,050 234,050 234,050
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for the event that the case is appealed. For each case, nsame−type, w/in 1yr (w/in
2yrs; ever) is the (per 1000) number of cases of the same type assigned to the judge before the hearing within 1 year (within
2 years; ever). Similarly for nother−type. Odd (even) columns estimate Linear probability (Probit) Models with Judges fixed
(random) effects. Even columns report average partial effects (at the means of the variables) obtained estimating probit random
effect models that allow the random effects to be correlated with nsame−type, w/in 1yr (w/in 2yrs; ever), see Section 15.8.2 in
Wooldrige (2010). All regressions control for the number of parties involved in the trial.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Online Appendix
OA Testing random allocation of cases
Our econometric strategy relies on the random assignment of cases to judges.
In this Appendix we test for randomness in the assignment.
To provide a concrete sense of what the assignment process looks like,
Table OA.1 reports an extract of case assignment for two consecutive weeks
for six judges. These six judges receive on average 8.5 and 8.8 cases, respec-
tively in the two weeks. In the first one, judge 38 receives seven cases; in
the second week s/he receives 8 cases. Random assignment of cases across
judges will occasionally generate streaks of same-type cases which create
mini-specialization events that occur exogenously. Such events can be seen
in Table OA.1: for instance, judge 38 receives no type-1 cases in the first
week and s/he receives 4 type-1 cases in the following week. To test formally
for random assignment during these two weeks across all judges, we report
the p-values for Pearsons Chi-square tests computed for the 45 judges that
were on duty in each of these two weeks.10 This test checks whether judges
(rows) and type of cases (columns) are independent and therefore whether
cases are randomly assigned to judges. The two p-values are well above .10
and so the null hypothesis of random assignment cannot be rejected in the
data. This test indicates that the variation in case type allocated to judges
within each of these two weeks is random and not systematic.
Extending this logic beyond this two-week 6-judges extract, we test for
random assignment by computing the Chi-square tests of independence be-
tween the judge id and several case characteristics for all weeks and all judges.
These characteristics are the type of controversy in 9 categories (9 dummies);
an aggregation of the type of controversy in emergency cases11; a dummy for
10We assume that a judge is on duty if s/he receives at least a case during a particular
week.
11By analogy with what happens in a hospital emergency room, where red code cases
are those that, according to judges, are urgent thus requiring immediate action and/or
greater effort
1
Table OA.1: A two-week 6-judges extract of case assignment, and p-values
Judge Case type: Cases
ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 assigned
Week 18, 2006
38 0 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 7
39 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 11
40 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 8
42 4 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 10
43 1 3 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 7
44 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 2 0 8
Random assignment (p-value) .885
Week 19, 2006
38 4 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 8
39 2 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 8
40 1 4 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 10
42 1 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 8
43 4 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 10
44 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 9
Random assignment (p-value) .994
Note: Random assignment (p-value) is the p-value of the Pearsons χ2 tests computed for the judges that received
at least a case in each of the weeks. These six judges are a sub-sample of the 45 judges for which we compute the
tests for weekly random assignment.
the plaintiff lawyer being from Rome; the number of involved parties (capped
at 10).
In Figure OA.1 circles are the p-values of the Chi-square tests of indepen-
dence between the identity of judges and the characteristics of cases: type
of controversy in 9 categories; a dichotomous aggregation of the types of
controversy in red code; a dummy for firing cases; zip code of the plaintiff’s
lawyer (55 codes); the “number of involved parties” (capped at 10). Dashed
(red) lines are correct significance levels computed with the Benjamini and
Hochberg (1995) multiple testing procedure. Light gray (black) circles indi-
cate the p-values above (below) the correct significance levels (dashed horiz-
zontal black line) that are computed with the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)
multiple testing procedure. Summary results of the weekly tests for random
assignment are presented in Table OA.2. The last row presents joint results
2
for all variables and all weeks. The first column reports the numbers of weeks
in which independence is rejected at the 5% level out of the 520 weeks on
which the test is conducted. The corresponding fraction of rejections is in
the second column. Since 5% is not the correct significance level in a context
of multiple testing, in the third column we report the significance levels cor-
rected with the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) method. When these correct
significance levels are used, the number of rejections declines considerably as
shown by the fraction of light gray circles. We can conclude that, within
each week, differences in assignments are due only to small sample variabil-
ity and are not systematic: in the long run, judges, receive qualitatively and
quantitatively similar portfolios of controversies.
Figure OA.1: P-values for all weeks, all judges: evidence of random assign-
ment
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Table OA.2: Tests for the random assignment of cases to judges
Rejections Fraction of Corrected Rejections Fraction of N
at 5% rejections at significance at corrected rejections at
significance 5% significance significance corrected significance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Allowances 111 .21 .0073 76 .15 520
Damages 10 .019 .000097 0 0 520
Oth.T.I 61 .12 .0033 34 .065 520
Disability 16 .031 .0002 2 .0038 520
Pension 23 .044 .0001 0 0 520
Temp.C. 107 .21 .0078 76 .15 520
Firing 61 .12 .002 21 .04 520
Qualif. 71 .14 .0022 21 .04 520
Oth.T.II 125 .24 .0069 72 .14 520
Emergency 77 .15 .0037 38 .073 520
Lawyer-RM 131 .25 .007 73 .14 520
N.Parties. 70 .13 .003 31 .06 520
Overall 863 .14 .0034 412 .066 6,240
Note: The table summarizes the evidence on the weekly random assignment of cases to judges, based on Chi-square tests of independence between the identity
of judges and five discrete characteristics of cases: type of controversy in 9 categories; a dichotomous aggregation of the types of controversy in Emergency cases,
which are those that, according to judges, are urgent and/or complicated; a dummy for firing cases; Lawyer-RM equal one if the plaintiff’s lawyer is from Rome;
the “number of involved parties” (capped at 10). The last row, Overall, presents joint results for all variables and all weeks. Rejections at 5% significance” are the
numbers of tests in which p-values are below 0.05. Correct significance levels are computed with the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) multiple testing procedure.
Rejections at correct significance are the numbers of tests in which p-values are below the correct significance levels.
4
OB Robustness checks
Table OB.1: Robustness: Effect of experience on the probability of closing a
case, OLS with standard errors clustered at judge level
Dep. Var. Prob.Close Prob.Close Prob.Close
Model LPM LPM LPM
Method OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
nsame−type, w/in 1yr 0.208***
(0.037)
nother−type, w/in 1yr -0.060***
(0.012)
nsame−type, w/in 2yrs 0.156***
(0.023)
nother−type, w/in 2yrs -0.046***
(0.008)
nsame−type, ever 0.049***
(0.015)
nother−type, ever -0.019
(0.012)
Test for βsame 6= βother: .268 .202 .068
p-value .001 .001 .001
Judge FE Yes Yes Yes
Week of hearing FE Yes Yes Yes
Type of case FE Yes Yes Yes
Hearing FE Yes Yes Yes
Week of assignment FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of judges 85 85 85
Number of cases 234,050 234,050 234,050
Observations 808,583 808,583 808,583
Note: Note: An observation is a hearing of a case. The dependent
variable is a dummy for the closure of a case in a given hearing. For
each case, nsame−type, w/in 1yr (w/in 2yrs; ever) is the (per 1000)
number of cases of the same type assigned to the judge before the
hearing w/in 1yr (w/in 2yrs; ever). Similarly for nother−type. All
regressions control for the number of parties involved in the trial.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the judge and week
of the hearing level (two-way clustering). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
5
Table OB.2: Robustness: Effect of specialization on the number of hearings
to close a case
Dep. Var N.Hearings N.Hearings N.Hearings
Method OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
nsame−type, w/in 1yr -2.0073***
(0.282)
nother−type, w/in 1yr 0.5370***
(0.099)
nsame−type, w/in 2yrs -1.5947***
(0.239)
nother−type, w/in 2yrs 0.2922***
(0.064)
nsame−type, ever -0.4256***
(0.087)
nother−type, ever 0.0937
(0.061)
Test for βsame 6= βother: -2.544 -1.887 -0.519
p-value 0.001 0.001 0.001
Avg. N.Hearings 3.457 3.457 3.457
Judge FE Yes Yes Yes
Type of case FE Yes Yes Yes
Week of assignment FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of judges 85 85 85
Observations 234,050 234,050 234,050
Note: An observation is a case. The dependent variable is the number of
hearings to close a case. For each case, nsame−type, w/in 1yr (w/in 2yrs;
ever) is the (per 1000) number of cases of the same type assigned to the
judge before the hearing within 1 year (within 2 years; ever). Similarly
for nother−type. All regressions control for the number of parties involved
in the trial. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the judge and
week of assignment level (two-way clustering). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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